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Toward Cooperation or Conflict on 
the Moon? 




James Clay Moltz 
The question of how the moon will be governed once humans return 
in about a decade and begin to establish permanent bases matters greatly to 
the future of international security. Already, a range of major powers have 
plans to participate in the moon’s further scientific exploration, commercial 
exploitation, and possible permanent settlement. If we count both manned 
and robotic activities, this list currently includes the United States, China, 
Russia, India, Germany, the United Kingdom, the European Space Agency, 
Japan, and South Korea. Other countries are likely to join this list in the 
coming years. 
Establishing a peaceful framework for lunar governance will be im­
portant, because hostile international relations on the moon are likely to 
lead to conflicts elsewhere in space and, possibly, on Earth. Such patterns 
regarding new frontiers have plagued the history of international rela­
tions for centuries. Indeed, despite frequent hopes for cooperation, most 
unclaimed territories historically have become sources of international 
conflict rather than serving as peaceful lebensraum. Typically, and consis­
tent with realist predictions about international politics, states have had 
a built-in penchant to pursue relative gains over their rivals and therefore 
have sought to seize and defend new resources to their own advantage. On 
the other hand, successful formation of a stable, transnational governance 
system—a mechanism for sharing or otherwise peacefully allocating the 
moon’s resources—could open the possibility for mutually beneficial and 
self-sustaining lunar commerce and settlement, consistent with neo-liberal 
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Toward Cooperation or Conflict on the Moon? 
institutionalist predictions. Such a model could have positive spin-off 
effects on Earth and set a cooperative pattern for further human explo­
ration and development of the rest of the solar system, spurring states to 
pool resources and engage in joint approaches to space’s many challenges. 
In such scenarios, hopes for “humankind” efforts in space—rather than 
state-driven rivalries—might be realized, something for which astronauts 
and cosmonauts who have visited space have often called. As Per Magnus 
Wijkman wrote on these issues in 1982, the “interdependence” of all 
actors in space provides “strong incentives” for the emergence of coop­
erative solutions.1 
Yet predictions from the literature on collective goods suggest that 
governing the “global commons” of space and the moon is likely to 
become increasingly difficult when finite resources face claims by mul­
tiple, self-interested actors. Such trends historically have led to processes 
of “enclosure” rather than successful collective management.2 Thus, the 
question facing lunar settlement is: Can such conflicts be avoided and, 
if so, how? 
In seeking to weigh possible alternative scenarios on the moon, this 
article analyzes historical cases of human settlement of remote regions and 
attempts to chart and categorize similarities and differences that might 
provide useful guidance for forecasting lunar governance—and, specifi­
cally, with the aim of avoiding international conflict. This study begins 
by comparing space to the international experience in three prior regions: 
settling the Americas in the 1500s, establishing permanent bases on the 
Antarctic continent in the late twentieth century, and managing the deep 
seabed since the 1980s. It then turns to the moon, starting with a historical 
survey of predictions about its settlement since the 1950s and relevant de­
velopments in the realm of international treaties affecting lunar activity. The 
article concludes by applying lessons drawn from the historical cases—and 
differences—to forecast likely directions on the moon. It argues that the 
current restraints imposed by moon-related treaties and the nonmilitary 
nature of the likely participants are likely to favor cooperation. But it cau­
tions that such forces will have to be balanced against the likely presence 
of highly competitive national motivations. This mixed set of influences 
suggests a less cooperative outcome than on the Antarctic continent but a 
far more cooperative result than emerged in the struggle over governance 
and sovereignty issues in the New World of the Americas. 
Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Fall 2009 [ 83 ] 
Moltz.indd   84 8/4/09   9:22:03 AM
James Clay Moltz 
The New World Experience—Territorial Conflict 
The European settlement of the New World in the Americas from 
the 1500s through the 1700s represents a process that is in many ways 
comparable to that of the coming human settlement of the moon. This 
earlier case involved nearly all of the great powers of the time (Portugal, 
Spain, France, Britain, the Netherlands, and Russia) and similarly dar­
ing, expensive, and risky national efforts. Their competition posed the 
prospect of destabilizing the existing international system by opening up 
a major new source of power and influence. The comparative weakness 
of the native peoples inhabiting the Americas at the time of this process 
resulted in their dislocation and eventual defeat by European colonizers, 
as one world forced itself, its more advanced technology, and its patterns 
of human organization, on another. In the process, however, these coun­
tries entered into conflict among themselves. 
An initial “conflict management” regime created by the papal-sponsored 
Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 divided the Americas into exclusive zones for 
the initial colonizers, Spain and Portugal. However, it soon fell apart due 
to several factors: (1) the wide availability of adequate sailing and naviga­
tion technology to locate and send rival missions to the New World, (2) 
the presence of multiple great powers in the international system, and (3) 
the absence of taboos against the use of weaponry and the corresponding 
acceptance of war as a means of conflict resolution. As a result, the out­
come of the process of settling the New World became one of repeated 
warfare and a carving and recarving of the map of the Americas, seen most 
significantly in North America. One of the reasons for these conflicts was 
that key European adversaries—who lacked contiguous borders in Europe 
(such as England and France)—often had intersecting or even overlapping 
territorial claims in the New World. As historian Clarence L. Ver Steeg 
notes, “The battle for empire was being fought on the North American 
continent rather than in Europe.”3 Thus, the New World served in differ­
ent periods as a kind of surrogate battlefield, although these conflicts often 
spilled back into Europe rather than dampening military tensions. Paul 
Kennedy summarizes that attitude of European rulers in moving aggres­
sively into the New World: “There was the prospect of gaining glory and 
riches, of striking at a rival and boosting the resources of one’s own coun­
try, and of converting new souls to the one true faith; what possible counter-
arguments could hold out against the launching of such ventures?”4 
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In regard to forms of governance, the basic political outcomes in the in­
dividual colonies were more or less a repetition of the various patterns in 
Europe, with the main social and political institutions and related forms of 
organization (religious, legal, legislative, and military) simply being trans­
ferred to the respective New World colonies. Although many of the colonies 
eventually achieved independence, their main postcolonial tendency was 
toward acceptance of existing concepts and structures (albeit with certain 
modifications). The ability of colonists to support themselves from the land 
and natural surroundings, the prevalence of “closed” mercantilist trading 
networks that reinforced economic links with their mother countries, and 
the great expanses of land failed to bring any requirement among them to 
form collective political institutions, which might have created shared gov­
ernance across the Americas.5 Instead, very broadly speaking, authoritarian 
national governments with a strong church presence tended to dominate 
in South and Central America, whereas different forms of representative 
government tended to prevail in British and French North America (at least 
following the departure of Holland, Russia, and Spain). 
In the economic realm, some analysts argue that the rapid institution of pri­
vate property rights benefitted New World development, since these rules and 
incentives stimulated hard work, the improvement of the land, and economic 
competition. But the rapid emergence of territorially based disputes also made 
international governance more difficult, as states vied to own and occupy the 
most profitable regions. For all of these reasons, patterns of interstate conflict 
predicted under theories of realism simply repeated themselves in the New 
World, as power—rather than cooperative rules and norms—dictated the 
resolution of differences between states over sovereignty in regard to both ter­
ritory and resources. Using Robert Jervis’ criteria for the successful develop­
ment of cooperative security regimes, we can observe that states at the time 
did not “prefer a more regulated environment,” did not “believe that others 
share[d] the value they place[d] on mutual security and cooperation,” and 
faced conditions in which “one or more actors believe[d] that security [was] 
best provided for by expansion.”6 Under the circumstances, efforts at conflict 
resolution through regime formation were bound to fail. 
The Antarctic Experience—Cooperation via the 

Postponement of National Claims
 
In the years immediately following World War II, the lessons and record 
of the establishment of a permanent human presence on the Antarctic 
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continent seemed poised to duplicate the experience of the New World. 
Indeed, conflicting territorial claims by Argentina, Australia, Britain, 
Chile, France, New Zealand, and Norway seemed to be leading toward 
heightened conflict, as several of these countries hoped to use the Antarc­
tic continent for strategic and economic advantages. However, there were 
three main differences in the Antarctic case, compared to the New World 
experience: (1) the presence of a bipolar international structure, in which 
neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was eager to see war erupt 
over disputes on the frozen continent; (2) Antarctica’s unclear military 
and commercial value, which raised doubts about the utility of force; and 
(3) the extreme severity of the climate, which raised the costs of human 
settlement significantly. As one analyst observed in 1980 regarding the 
emergence of peaceful relations on Antarctica: “The final reason for co­
operation between the personnel of different nationalities is simply one 
of survival. Given the small number of persons ever deployed in the Ant­
arctic, and the grave risks they run from accidents, they need to co-operate 
if only to look after themselves.”7 Some of these factors are similar to those 
in space and may play an important role in its eventual governance of the 
moon. However, the shift from bipolarity to today’s unipolarity and to pos­
sible future conditions of multipolarity may cause problems for the possible 
transformation of the existing Cold War regime in space. 
Influenced by the factors listed above, international negotiations over Ant­
arctica began in the 1950s toward a cooperative regime to ban traditional 
military and territorial competition. In 1959 these efforts came to fruition 
in the signing of the Antarctic Treaty, in which the main international ac­
tors agreed to postpone indefinitely their territorial claims and to establish 
a restrictive legal regime that banned military activity and unilateral com­
mercial exploitation on the continent. Although bipolarity assisted in the 
regime’s formation, fear of possible Soviet claims on the region in the early 
1950s also helped draw earlier claimants (such as Britain and Australia) into 
supporting these efforts as well.8 After the necessary national ratifications, 
the treaty entered into force in 1961. While the regime waived issues of 
sovereignty and prevented relative gains, it lasted for 25 years due to the 
benefits of conflict prevention and the peaceful scientific study it provided. 
In 1991 the regime faced a challenge as it came up for review and pos­
sible renewal. Given technological developments and the pressures for 
new oil supplies worldwide, some governments (and their corporations) 
pressured the states parties to open the continent for oil and other mineral 
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exploitation. But scientific and public outcry at the notion of the “loss” 
of this pristine continent eventually defeated commercial interests, and 
members of the treaty agreed to extend it for an additional 50 years, thus 
again putting off conflicting claims and development rights. Today, this 
historically remarkable experiment in conflict prevention through mutual 
self-restraint and nondevelopment remains in place, where many countries 
conduct research in jointly occupied and accessible stations. Commercial 
development remains limited to tourism, and activities in Antarctica still 
involve only a very small number of people, in part because of the expense 
of supporting them in the hostile climate. 
Although the regime has survived the end of bipolarity, with the emer­
gence of post–Cold War US hegemony, the reasons seem to have less to 
do with power than with shared thinking among the states—in political 
science terms, more of a “constructivist” notion.9 In other words, the goals 
of participants—thanks to the long-standing presence and institutionaliza­
tion of the Antarctic regime—seem to have converged around the notion of 
environmental protection of the continent rather than its possible economic 
development for personal gain.10 Looking to the future, the question of the 
regime’s stability will rely on this consensus. 
Indeed, some recent authors have criticized this anticommercial Ant­
arctic regime. As one analyst writes: 
Today, Antarctica is an example of what happens when property rights are denied 
and a government monopoly . . . is created. Rather than being a new job and 
wealth creator, activities on the continent are net expenditures to the taxpayers 
of the signatory nations. There is no growing infrastructure in and around the 
continent. There is no self-sustaining economy.11 
But environmentalists seeking to use Antarctic research to better under­
stand such issues as climate change, government officials seeking to avoid 
unnecessary international confrontation, and military leaders who would 
otherwise be responsible for defending vying national commercial enter­
prises have remained supporters of the treaty. For these reasons, states have 
thus far been able to maintain the political consensus needed to sustain it. 
Yet despite this example of a successful “conflict prevention” regime 
in the Antarctic, there are very few experts or officials calling for such a 
noncommercial structure for the moon. The major question, therefore, 
is whether the moon’s coming settlement will generate the economic, 
political, and eventual military conflicts typical of the New World, as well 
as similar cases of European exploitation of Africa and much of Asia prior 
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to World War I, or whether more successful conflict-prevention strategies 
can be developed. Before moving to the emerging moon race, one final 
and potentially relevant comparative case merits examination––the deep 
seabed. Like space, this region also contains potentially valuable minerals 
that might form the source of conflicts, but it has remained peaceful largely 
due to the impact of regime formation—although, similarly, not without 
the emergence of strong critics. 
The Seabed Experience 
In the second half of the twentieth century, the development of floating 
oil platforms and deep submersibles capable of reaching the sea bottom 
raised hopes that untold riches might soon be reaped from its develop­
ment. But the questions in terms of governance were by whom and under 
whose control. Again, the United States and the Soviet Union sought to 
avoid conflict and the unilateral seizure of resources by any single country. 
After a process of international negotiation initiated by the superpowers in 
the late 1960s, the United Nations emerged as the main body empowered 
to address these issues and to consider options for international man­
agement and conflict prevention. In 1982, participating officials finally 
reached agreement on a system of rules and guidelines that both expanded 
national control over coastal regions and also facilitated (and required) 
international oversight of commercial activity on the ocean floor, which 
would be excluded from possible national territorial appropriation. By the 
time of its agreement, however, the United States had largely soured on 
the process. The Reagan administration refused to sign the eventual UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) due to its opposition to 
the extension of exclusionary territorial waters and UN treatment of the 
seabed as the “common heritage of mankind.”  
To govern the seabed, the UNCLOS established a body called the Inter­
national Seabed Authority (ISA). The ISA required that any prospecting 
for minerals in the seabed be conducted only after international approval 
and licensing to ensure compliance with the UNCLOS clause regarding 
the “common heritage of mankind.” The treaty called for revenues from 
deep-sea mining to be pooled centrally and redistributed to cover (1) ISA 
administrative costs, (2) profits for the mining enterprises themselves, 
(3) compensation for states whose mining operations might be harmed 
economically by seabed operations, and (4) claims by other countries to 
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benefit from international seabed development.12 Due largely to these 
“redistributive” clauses, the United States remains outside the UNCLOS 
regime today. 
However, there has been an upsurge of recent US interest (including 
among leading military officials and members of the US Senate) in con­
sidering possible accession to the UNCLOS. Today, the main interest is 
to facilitate antiterrorism efforts and to give the United States a seat at 
the table in emerging debates over attempts by some countries (such as 
Russia) to use extensions of national geographical formations into the 
deep oceans as the basis for mineral and transit control claims, particu­
larly in the Arctic. Some recent critics, however, have argued that join­
ing the UNCLOS agreement will set a precedent of applying the UN 
redistributive concepts to the moon, thus purportedly harming incentives 
for commercial activity, since it bans private property and requires inter­
national approval of all development schemes. To date, there have been 
six countries (China, France, India, Japan, Russia, and South Korea) and 
one international consortium that have registered as “pioneer investors” 
with the ISA,13 thereby retaining exploratory (but not yet exploitative) 
rights to certain identified regions of the seabed. But no commercial min­
ing has yet taken place. Indeed, to date, the development of the so-called 
Mining Code has not yet been completed.14 Critics argue that the weight 
of international regulations and the inability of states to own sections of 
the seabed have thwarted development to date. Supporters of the regime 
have noted the high costs of deep seabed exploration due to the technolo­
gies involved and indicated the benefits of international control: prevent­
ing abuses, unilateral exploitation, and environmental damage. Due to 
its still-incomplete implementation, however, the UNCLOS remains an 
experience whose lessons remain unclear for application to the moon’s 
future governance. 




The literature appearing since the 1950s on the moon’s future settle­
ment is voluminous. Moreover, it offers a range of governance options, 
from hostile military predictions to visions of scientific harmony. It is 
worth surveying this literature in some detail to understand the different 
concerns raised by various authors over time. As is frequently the case, 
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their conflicting predictions reflect fundamental differences in their under­
lying views of international relations, the motivations of states, and the 
prospects for successful and sustainable cooperation. 
In the late 1950s, many military analysts predicted that the moon would 
become the ultimate “high ground” for defense and associated military 
operations, reflecting traditional realist assumptions about this new en­
vironment and the gloomy outlook for superpower cooperation in the 
midst of the Cold War. Senior officers, like Lt Gen Donald L. Putt, USAF, 
called in 1958 for the establishment of a US lunar missile base, which 
would purportedly give Washington the ability to rain nuclear weapons 
“down” on the Soviet Union while helping to establish a series of US mili­
tary outposts on other planets for coming space warfare and competitive 
colonization. In this scenario, the moon was viewed simply as another pawn 
in the superpower conflict—bound to repeat the military-led dynamics seen 
on prior new frontiers. Critics, however, pointed out logical contradictions 
in this plan, noting that “if you did launch a bomb from the moon, the 
warhead would take five days to reach the earth. The war might be over by 
then.”15 Accordingly, after further vetting, such plans for military forces on 
the moon never reached fruition. 
Other, more scientifically inclined space analysts predicted instead the 
possible supplanting of earthly competition through space exploration, re­
flective of institutionalist concepts regarding international relations. Such 
sentiments stemmed naturally from the hoped-for cooperation of scientists 
within the context of the International Geophysical Year (IGY) in 1957–58. 
British space enthusiast Arthur C. Clarke went even further—toward con­
temporary constructivist notions—in suggesting that cooperative space 
activities could provide a peaceful sublimation of man’s “aggressive and 
pioneering instincts.”16 German-born analyst Willey Ley17 and US physi­
cist Albert R. Hibbs also expressed hopes for significant international co­
operation in space and on the moon.18 A similar form of technological 
optimism and the expected rapid settlement of the moon pervaded Erik 
Bergaust’s 1964 book, The Next Fifty Years in Space, which predicted an 
active settlement program by the 1970s led by nuclear-powered rockets 
and moon-based nuclear reactors.19 
While falling far short of the cooperative hopes of scientists, efforts by 
the two superpowers to “manage” space competition and rule out its more 
harmful manifestations—such as nuclear weapons—began in 1963. Two 
UN resolutions approved in the fall of that year called for states to refrain 
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from placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit and to apply existing 
legal principles and protections to space activity. Meanwhile, the signing 
of the 1963 US-Soviet-UK Limited Test Ban Treaty banned further tests 
of nuclear weapons in space after nine orbital explosions from 1958 to 
1962 had caused serious damage to a number of first-generation satellites. 
Subsequent steps went further, as the superpowers sought to prevent the 
moon race from spilling over into direct conflict or other hostile actions. 
In negotiating and signing the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST), the super­
powers accepted a range of mutual legal restrictions on their own activities, 
including those planned for the moon.20 
For example, Article II of the OST stated that the moon “is not subject 
to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or oc­
cupation, or by any other means.”21 While most experts have since argued 
that this bans private property, the language was vague enough to suggest 
that some forms of commercial appropriation (particularly if carried out 
under international sanction) were possible. A perhaps more critical issue 
in terms of conflict prevention was Article IV, which drew on the 1959 
Antarctic Treaty’s restrictions and required that “military bases, installa­
tions and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons, and the con­
duct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden.” 
Also limiting potential lunar commercial activities and promoting 
notions of sustainable development was Article IX, which required states 
in their activities on the moon and other celestial bodies alike to “avoid 
their harmful contamination.” Finally, Article XII of the treaty outlined an 
inspection regime to promote transparency and cooperation, stating: “All 
stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon and other 
celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other States Parties to the 
Treaty on a basis of reciprocity.” Again, these principles came directly from 
the Antarctic Treaty, which was fresh on the minds of the government lawyers 
and diplomats who put together the OST. 
With the détente era just beginning to emerge and with the OST in 
place, analyst Neil P. Ruzic boldly outlined in 1970 a possible “phased” 
progression from competition to gradual cooperation on the moon. Ruzic 
predicted an initial phase characterized by rival US and Soviet bases fol­
lowed by eventual collaboration spurred by the practical needs of the two 
sides to join together to overcome common survival challenges on the 
moon.22 As he predicted the progress of superpower rapprochement on 
the moon by 2010, “it became cheaper for the two spacefaring nations of 
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Earth to pool their resources in a cooperative effort than to compete.”23 
Although clearly overly optimistic about the date of this development— 
and the presence of several thousand “lunarians” by this time—Ruzic’s ap­
proach was rooted in the influence of practical settlement-related demands 
on governance and the eventual institutionalization of cooperation. Ruzic 
predicted that, indeed, as cooperation on the moon developed further and 
the lunar population increased, an independent “lunar legislature” would 
emerge to decide critical functional issues, thus suggesting the transfer of 
sovereignty questions from Earth residents to those of the moon itself. 
In reality, however, interest in moon settlement dampened considerably 
after the Apollo landing in 1969. Pres. Richard Nixon shelved the US lunar 
program in the early 1970s, and no human beings have since stepped 
on the moon’s surface. The technologies for a permanent settlement were 
deemed too expensive, and the “demand” for the moon’s colonization 
proved relatively weak, particularly when placed into the context of the 
more urgent resource demands of the Vietnam War, Johnson’s Great So­
ciety programs, and dealing with the economic implications of emerging 
US oil dependency on the Middle East. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union 
declined to take on the risks and expense of its own human exploration 
on the moon since the Americans had already taken the big prize. Visions 
of lunar futurists moved quietly to the back burner. 
But as other countries sought to prevent what appeared to be a threat of 
the moon’s exclusive future settlement by the two superpowers, the United 
Nations hosted an effort to craft a moon treaty in the 1970s. The eventual 
draft document called for international control over lunar resources and 
the formation of an international organization to allocate profits, similar 
to efforts at the time in regard to the seabed. The draft also emphasized 
that the moon’s resources could not be “claimed” by any nation and that 
they constituted instead the “common heritage of mankind.” The Moon 
Treaty’s signing by several states in 1979 and its entry into force in 1984 
(despite lack of support from either superpower) caused scholars and ana­
lysts to begin to examine possible international governance models for the 
moon in the context of the new treaty. 
Recognizing the presence of the Moon Treaty, but seeking to avoid pos­
sible obstacles to development posed by its “common heritage of mankind” 
clause and requirement for the formation of an international authority to 
govern commercial operations, Christopher C. Joyner and former astronaut 
Harrison H. Schmitt sought an interpretation of the agreement that could 
[ 92 ] Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Fall 2009 
Moltz.indd   93 8/4/09   9:22:06 AM
Toward Cooperation or Conflict on the Moon? 
nevertheless promote successful economic development of the moon. In 
this effort, they looked not to the experience of the UNCLOS, but instead 
to the more space-relevant example of INTELSAT, the US-led organiza­
tion that had helped foster the satellite communications industry while 
sharing the benefits of this technology with non-space-faring nations. 
Their concept, which they dubbed INTERLUNE, aimed at creating a 
“feasible administrative system and a peaceful management environment” 
to facilitate the moon’s settlement and development without conflicts.24 
The idea behind INTERLUNE was inherently collaborative but, like the 
Antarctic system, would be based on governance according to participa­
tion in settlement activities. It went further, however, in calling for shares 
and voting within the organization to be determined by a country’s level 
of investment. Such a structure, according to Joyner and Schmitt, would 
avoid the problem of nonspace actors trying to “dictate” to space pioneers 
while both allowing profits to be had from the moon’s settlement and 
creating a viable international governance structure that would be peace­
fully oriented, legally transparent, and open to new members. At the same 
time, INTERLUNE would avoid the problems of unilateral settlement 
schemes and the almost inevitable conflicts such models would likely 
entail. Interestingly, the current literature on lunar governance seems to 
have forgotten this innovative suggestion. But the idea remains relevant, 
particularly as states and nonstate actors seek to move from initial return 
flights to more permanent lunar settlements. 
Other writings from the mid-1980s predicted a very gradual process of 
settling the moon, starting first with the goal of “scientific observation” 
and only much later (likely after 2035) moving into commercial exploita­
tion.25 From this context, early moon return missions could be compared 
historically to some of the great scientific expeditions that had spurred 
exploration of the American West, Africa, and the Antarctic from the early 
1800s to the early 1900s. As Phillip M. Smith writes, these missions by Great 
Britain, France, Russia, and the United States (among others) were similar 
to likely future lunar or Mars missions in that “one left with the expecta­
tion of being away from home for several years, possibly not returning at 
all.”26 The more advanced state of international cooperation in scientific 
exploration by the late twentieth century, according to Smith, increased 
the chances that lunar governance might be developed on the basis of 
multinational scientific collaboration. However, writing at the height of 
US-Soviet tensions during the Reagan administration, Smith argued that 
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analysts should not neglect the importance of nationalism in motivating 
expeditions like the moon’s settlement. He predicted that true interna­
tional collaboration by 2035 was “difficult to imagine.”27 Smith viewed the 
most likely outcome as one in which a major country—probably the United 
States—would take the lead in lunar exploration and then accept partners on a 
per contribution basis, similar to the then-developing plan for the then-US-led 
international space station. 
A competing, institutionalist approach developed by Amanda Lee 
Moore offered the model of the International Telecommunications Union’s 
regulation of radio frequencies and geostationary orbital slots as a possible 
example for successful lunar governance.28 She proposed that a confer­
ence of states might address contentious issues, such as the Moon Treaty’s 
“common heritage of mankind” clause, and simply lay out an interpreta­
tion of this vague phrase that would rule out national sovereignty over 
lunar real estate but accept notions of profit and economic development. 
In general, Moore posited that muddling through in an ad hoc manner 
via bilateral agreements among states active in moon exploration, while 
possible, would lead to far from optimal solutions to the lunar governance 
dilemma compared to formal, international efforts to lay out clear rules to 
govern state behavior. 
As technology advanced in the late 1990s and global tensions eased 
following the Soviet Union’s demise, another “take” on the moon’s settle­
ment emerged from Artemis Society29 member and chief executive of the 
so-called Lunar Development Corporation Gregory Bennett—one led by 
space tourism.30 The concept outlined the initial reestablishment of human 
exploration on the moon via privately funded tourism, which would 
create the necessary life-support infrastructure. While most analysts fo­
cused on industrial enterprises—like the mining of helium-3—Bennett 
argued provocatively, “I’d rather see it developed like Honolulu.” Such a 
scenario ruled out national competition as the primary motivation, focus­
ing instead on profit and “fun.”31 However, such notions challenged the 
Outer Space Treaty (given its lack of specific mechanisms for allotting 
lunar locations) and rejected the Antarctic model outright, possibly sow­
ing the seeds for at least commercial conflict. Today, whether the tourism 
industry will lead the process of lunar settlement still remains to be seen, 
although a few private organizations supporting moon development (such 
as the Netherlands-based LUNEX group) have already crafted elaborate 
scenarios around this possibility. The question raised by realist theory is 
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whether military forces might eventually be required to “defend” such 
commercial assets. Such future pressures, on the other hand, might be 
mitigated by multinational ownership or at least financing of such ven­
tures, which is likely. 
In the twenty-first-century literature on lunar governance alternatives, 
some of the most active and vocal authors have focused on commercial 
issues and the perceived “anti-development” bias of the OST—also 
explicitly rejecting the Antarctic experience. Indeed, a virtual cottage 
industry has emerged criticizing the OST as “unworkable” and even 
an impediment to settlement of the moon because of its ban on pri­
vate property rights. The argument is that Antarctica “proves” that such 
treaties impede commercial development to the detriment of all plans 
for lunar mining, solar farms, construction, tourism, or other profit-
oriented activities.32 As Robert Zimmerman argues, “While [the United 
States] might have won the Cold War here on Earth, the Soviet Union 
apparently has won the Cold War in space,”33 implying a link between 
Soviet communism and UN-based governance formulas. He foresees no 
possible future for moon development under the current legal regime and 
urges the United States to withdraw from the OST. 
Although some recent analysts argue that such a “free for all” approach 
would best benefit lunar development, others, such as Everett Dolman, 
support an OST withdrawal only in the context of its replacement by a 
new regime.34 In Dolman’s view, the new structure “must rest on prin­
ciples and norms consistent with capitalism and liberal democracy, and at 
the same time must recognize the obligation the richer states have to assist 
the poorer ones in a domain in which they cannot compete.”35 To others, 
given the growing trend toward capitalism already extant across the globe 
(even in China), this might better be done by clarifying implementation 
clauses for the OST and the Moon Treaty, rather than walking away from 
the existing legal framework for space entirely. 
The literature on regime transformation suggests that such develop­
ments most often occur in the presence of one of three factors: (1) internal 
contradictions within the regime, (2) a change in the structure of power 
that affects the regime, or (3) an exogenous change in technology or other 
relevant influence.36 In regard to the first factor, some critics might argue 
that the OST regime is contradictory by allowing for lunar development 
but denying national property rights. While it is true that the OST for­
bids national ownership, existing practice in certain other areas allows 
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such development without providing specific property rights to the 
developer. (An example might be a lease to drill for oil in a national park 
or forest.) Regarding the second factor, it is clear that the structure of the 
international system has shifted from superpower bipolarity to conditions 
of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War and may be on its way to 
some form of future multipolarity. At the same time, no countries have 
indicated an intention to withdraw from the OST to date. Whether such 
shifts in relative power will lead to future withdrawals remains to be seen. 
Finally, we cannot rule out the possibility of an exogenous change that 
might affect the OST. For example, a sudden breakthrough in the cost 
of spaceflight allowing all nations to send missions to the moon could 
put unbearable commercial (and political) pressure on the existing OST 
system. To date, however, it is hard to imagine a shift that would allow 
more than a small number of the most technologically advanced countries 
to lead the process of settling the moon. For these reasons, any “require­
ment” for the OST regime’s transformation is as yet unclear. 
In a provocative recent article, space analyst Andrew Brearley argues 
for the OST’s continued relevance, albeit with possible future modifica­
tions or clarifications. He makes the point that “even though the OST 
prevents states from owning the moon, it does not prevent them from 
exploiting it.”37 Brearley compares the future lunar legal environment to 
that associated with the seabed, a similar “global commons.”38 He makes 
the case that an international management organization modeled on the 
UNCLOS arrangement could serve as an effective governance tool for 
the moon. Pointing specifically to follow-on implementation agreements 
in 1996 associated with the UNCLOS to make it more palatable to ma­
jor states that might become engaged in seabed mining, Brearley argues 
that similar implement agreements might be reached regarding the Moon 
Treaty, if agreed to by major space-faring states.39 He proposes what he 
calls a Lunar Resource Authority to govern applications for and man­
agement of mining operations by states or commercial consortia. This 
agreement would allow profit making, but without transferring actual 
ownership of sections of the moon to specific countries or enterprises, 
thus remaining consistent with the OST. One option would be through 
a licensing system, which would create the “pseudo property rights” that 
Brearley believes are needed to allow successful commercial operations to 
be pursued.40 
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Another take on these institutional issues is provided by space lawyer 
Rosanna Sattler.41 She points out the gaps in the existing legal framework 
for the moon’s development and accepts the problems posed by trying to 
follow the Antarctic model. But she suggests that solutions can be found 
by modifying current treaties and looking to other models within exist­
ing space law, citing in particular the International Space Station Inter­
governmental Agreement (ISSIA). The ISSIA, she argues, “could easily 
be applied to space tourism, settlement, and bases of operation on . . . 
the Moon and Mars.”42 Although under the coordination of NASA, the 
ISSIA provides for individual technological development by member 
states and a system for international dispute resolution by referral either to the 
International Court of Justice or the World Trade Organization, depending 
on the nature of the conflict. To date, no disputes have risen to that level. 
Another concept Sattler views as worthy of investigation is that of the 
UNCLOS Exclusive Economic Zones, which could be activated on the 
moon through a system of “long-term leases or licenses.” Overall, Sattler 
outlines a system based on “combining and refining elements” of existing 
international law while emphasizing the importance of gaining “support 
from the industrialized nations.”43 
The debate on the issue of commercial development of the moon’s 
resources is an important and still unresolved one. As Brearley notes, it 
would be highly desirable for states to settle these issues before the next 
humans set foot on the moon. Once humans begin landing and stay­
ing on the moon, complex issues will quickly arise. Key variables in the 
process of international discussion and possible negotiation include (1) 
the nature of the leading space actors and their interrelations at the time 
of the moon’s settlement, ( 2) the status of existing space-related treaties 
and restraint-based norms, (3) the prospects for lucrative contracts (which 
could promote either competition or cooperation), (4) the extent of the 
resources and locations available (more likely to promote competition), 
and (5) the availability of cost-effective technology for their exploitation. 
Of all these factors, the first two—the status of international relations 
among participants and their willingness to comply with existing space 
treaties and norms—may be the most important, even above resource scar­
city or the availability of technology. It almost goes without saying that 
friendly relations and cooperative exploratory projects on the moon and 
in the solar system will greatly increase the chances of successful management 
of moon conflicts. This suggests that realist factors alone are not likely to 
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dictate a break-up of the OST or the existing consensus on cooperative 
restraint on the exercise of military power. Of course, hostile relations 
(such as between the United States and China) cannot be ruled out and 
could lead to unilateral efforts to seize locations and establish nationally 
oriented keep-out and governance regimes, whether or not resources are 
scarce. However, violation of the OST in this manner could have other 
repercussions on space security and would have to be considered carefully 
by any state undertaking such policies. Hostile or self-serving actions on 
the moon could harm a country’s interests in other areas of space or on 
Earth, leading to rival coalitions against it and efforts to undercut its 
attempted unilateral gains—possibly through military means. 
Considering the rival conceptual approaches reviewed above, while 
looking back at the three prior cases analyzed in this article (the New 
World, Antarctica, and the seabed) and comparing them to the moon, 
we see in the table below that the presence or absence of certain incen­
tives and institutional factors have affected outcomes on past international 
frontiers and might be expected to contribute to outcomes on the moon 
as well. These include the nature of the international system (and the level 
of conflict); the nature of the physical environment (and related costs of 
settlement); the acceptability of territorial acquisition and military activi­
ties; the viability of commercial activities; and the existence (or absence) of 
a transnational governance structure (regime) for the new frontier. These 
factors have all contributed in various ways to either conflictual or coop­
erative outcomes. On the last point, the role of the existing international 
regime embedded in the OST may be especially significant. 
As Robert Keohane argues on the impact of regimes in shaping the 
behavior of states: 
International regimes alter the information available to governments and the op­
portunities open to them; commitments made to support such institutions can 
only be broken at a cost to reputation. International regimes therefore change the 
calculations of advantage that governments make.44 
The challenge in space will be whether legal and political developments 
that emerged in the late twentieth century can mitigate possible twenty­
first-century hostilities while also allowing the moon (and other celestial 
bodies) to be both explored scientifically and developed commercially un­
der likely conditions of future multipolarity in the international system. 
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In reviewing the findings of this study, we can observe that there is 
no predetermined outcome in regard to the moon. At the same time, 
there are certain tendencies that will affect lunar governance and shape 
the factors likely to play an important role in determining the specific 
regime formed. In terms of policy recommendations for avoiding hostile 
outcomes on the moon, several specific measures should be considered by 
states—and, preferably, soon. 
First, if conflict is to be avoided, countries planning to go to the moon 
would be well advised to begin discussions in advance of the actual mis­
sions to develop protocols for peaceful interaction. Fortunately, some of 
these measures are tentatively being developed in the context of the Inter­
national Lunar Network, a collective effort by national space agencies and 
universities to develop a common set of scientific standards and communi­
cative mechanisms to ensure international ability to cooperate and benefit 
from one another’s data in upcoming lunar missions. 
Second, national governments would be wise to clarify existing am­
biguities in the OST regime. This might require a formal review of the 
treaty to discuss definitions and develop an implementing agreement for 
multilateral understandings on how to interpret the OST in regard to 
specific lunar activities (particularly, regarding permitted and prohibited 
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settlement practices). A similar review of clauses in the 1968 Agreement 
on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space would be beneficial to clarify possible 
provisions that may foster mutual assistance during moon operations. 
Third, countries planning human or robotic commerce on the moon 
would be well served to begin discussions toward development of a code of 
“lunar commercial conduct,” particularly in terms of compliance with the 
OST. As stated above, the OST is vague on these provisions, and consider­
able leeway is available to states collectively to determine how they wish to 
divide resources, benefits, and claims to specific areas. Such a commercial 
code could substitute for the dearth of support for the Moon Treaty’s provi­
sions and yet still provide meaningful guidelines and help prevent conflict. 
It could also help create a workable formula (or mechanism) for sharing the 
moon’s “benefits” internationally, in compliance with Article I of the OST 
that calls for all space exploration to be conducted “for the benefit and in the 
interests of all countries.” Such efforts will have to be constructed in such a 
manner that they are not unduly burdensome for the individual commercial 
aims of states on the moon or such states (and their companies) may decide 
to break out of such accords. 
Fourth, states, companies, universities, and other entities planning activities 
on the moon might usefully establish a formal consultative council for the 
settlement of any problems that might emerge among scientists, tourists, 
or commercial operators on the moon. This body could simply be a stand­
ing committee that would meet only to address specific disputes raised 
before it, or it could serve as a clearinghouse for emerging problems that 
are best dealt with in a preventive manner. 
Fifth, political relations affecting the moon’s settlement would benefit if 
all of the parties planning to become involved in lunar exploration would 
publicly reiterate their support for Article IV of the OST on nonmili­
tarization of the moon. Similarly, the voluntary development of practical 
protocols and transparency mechanisms to facilitate mutual inspections 
of lunar facilities—as in the Antarctic—would also promote trust and 
cooperation and work in the service of conflict prevention. 
While pressures for “enclosure” of the moon and the privatization of its 
resources are likely to increase in the coming decades—at least until more 
specific management structures are developed and implemented—there 
are reasonable grounds for believing that cooperative efforts may eventually 
succeed. The combined effects of economic globalization, modern 
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communications, increasing lunar mission transparency, and the recent 
internationalization of large space activities (such as the International 
Space Station), should help facilitate these trends. Broader international 
trends toward the adoption of rule-based behavior (such as in the World 
Trade Organization) and negotiated approaches to conflict resolution sup­
port institutionally based outcomes on the moon. Thus, while history’s 
“lessons” in regard to international cooperation on the moon may be pes­
simistic, specific differences in the factors surrounding lunar settlement 
offer reasons to believe that the negative experience on certain past fron­
tiers may be avoided. The remaining question seems to be the willingness 
of current and future leaders to recognize the remaining risks and chal­
lenges that exist regarding successful lunar governance and to begin talks 
to address possible disputes through preventive diplomacy and existing 
international agreements and organizational structures. These develop­
ments are far from inevitable, but such possibilities—in the context of 
the relevant history of similar environments and the implications of direct 
military conflict today—seem to have the force of mutual self-interest 
behind them. 
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